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The contraposing conditional ‘If A then C’ is defined by the conjunction of A > C
and ¬C > ¬A, where > is a conditional of the kind studied by Stalnaker, Lewis
and others. This idea has recently been explored, under the name ‘evidential con-
ditional’, in a sequence of papers by Crupi and Iacona and Raidl, and it has been
found of independent interest by Booth and Chandler. I discuss various properties
of these conditionals and compare them to the ‘difference-making conditionals’
studied by Rott, which are defined by the conjunction of A > C and not ¬A > C.
I raise some doubts about Crupi and Iacona’s claim that contraposition captures
the idea of evidence or support.
“. . . es ist manchmal, als wollte La¨ngstverblu¨htes
und La¨ngstentbla¨ttertes aus der Jugendzeit
noch einmal zum Leben erwachen.”1
Alexius Meinong, letter to Hans Vaihinger, 21 May 1911
1. Contraposing conditionals. The following idea has been studied, apparently in-
dependently and in somewhat different ways of presentation, by Vincenzo Crupi and
Andrea Iacona in “The Evidential Conditional” (2019b) and Richard Booth and Jake
Chandler (in work elaborating on Booth and Chandler 2020). Crupi and Iacona use a
system-of-spheres possible worlds semantics a` la Lewis (1973), Booth and Chandler
the belief-state revision framework of Darwiche and Pearl (1997). Eric Raidl (2019)
provided the first completeness proof for the ‘evidential conditional’ using selection
functions in the style of Chellas (1975). Raidl, Crupi and Iacona (2020) provide a
nicer axiomatic system and spell out all the details of the completeness proof.
Let us speak about contraposing conditionals (a term used by Jake Chandler) and base
our discussion on this definition:
1“. . . it is sometimes as if something long-withered and long-defoliated from our early days wanted
to return to life again.”
1
(CPC) A BC iff A > C and ¬C > ¬A.
Here A > C should be read as ‘If A, then C’. It is an ordinary (‘suppositional’) con-
ditional of the kind that has been studied in conditional logic since the pioneering
works of Stalnaker and Lewis. Crupi and Iacona call a rule very much like (CPC) the
‘Chrysippus Test’2 and claim that it “seems required in order to preserve the intuition
that A must support C” and that it “characterizes the evidential interpretation” accord-
ing to which “a conditional is true just in case its antecedent provides evidence for
its consequent” (2019b, pp. 2, 5). Booth and Chandler (2020, Proposition 12), who
read ‘ABC’ as ‘A is taken to support C’, derive CPC from another, more fundamental
definition of support involving iterated belief changes,3 coupled with the idea that these
belief changes apply the method of restrained revision (Booth and Meyer 2006).
In most of the following I suppose (similarly to Crupi and Iacona as well as Booth and
Chandler) that the base conditional > satisfies something very much like Lewis’ con-
ditional logic VW (i.e., VC without Centering). The distinctive property of B is that it
satisfies Contraposition, essentially by definition. Two other very important properties
are that it satisfies neither Strengthening of the Antecedent (aka Monotonicity) nor
Weakening the Consequent (aka Right Weakening, RW):
(Mon) If A BC and B ` A, then B BC. Strengthening the Antecedent
(RW) If A BC and C ` B, then A B B. Weakening the Consequent
2. Valid and invalid inference schemes for contraposing conditionals. The following
is all very simple. I just check, with a VW-like background logic for >, the validity of
a few principles, and give counterexamples, using linear orders of possible worlds, to a
few other principles. Possible worlds here are really partial possible worlds (only very
few facts that matter are represented), and they will be identified with valuations (thus
the models are ‘injective’). The notation ‘pqr ≺ pqr ’, for example, means that pqr
(the world at which p, q and r are all true) is closer to the evaluation world than/more
plausible than/more normal than, pqr (the world at which p and q are true and r is
false). A > C is true at a world/accepted iff the closest/most plausible A-worlds are all
C-worlds.
Crupi and Iacona have addressed the following principles (with the exception of Dis-
junctive Rationality) in their earlier paper “Three Ways of Being Non-Material” (2019a).
Chandler mentions some of these principles in his emails. Perhaps the main point
worth highlighting in advance is that contraposing conditionals fail to satisfy Rational
2Personally, I think that Sanford (1989, pp. 68–69) is right when he states: “[C.I.] Lewis’s account of
strict implication is . . . as close as it can be to the account of the conditional we attribute to Chrysippus.”
3Here it is: A is taken to support B in belief state Ψ, in symbols ABB, if and only if B ∈ (Ψ∗¬B)∗A.
This reading was given to me by Jake Chandler in personal communication. In the paper quoted Booth
and Chandler actually use a somewhat different terminology and say that A strictly overrules ¬B (in Ψ)
iff B ∈ (Ψ ∗ ¬B) ∗ A. Condition (30) in Rott (1986, p. 353), EV3 in Chandler (2013, p. 390) and RT−G in
Andreas and Gu¨nther (2019, p. 1241) are similar definitions.
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Monotony, but satisfy the weaker condition of Disjunctive Rationality. For >, Dis-
junctive Rationality is known to be strictly stronger than Negation Rationality if non-
injective models are allowed. The models of Crupi and Iacona are non-injective: there
may be different worlds that satisfy exactly the same sentences (cf. Lehmann and Ma-
gidor 1992, Freund 1993, Freund and Lehmann 1996).
Possible principles for B:
(And) If A B B and A BC, then A B B ∧C. Conjunction in the Consequent
(Or) If A BC and B BC, then A ∨ B BC. Disjunction in the Antecedent
(CMon) If A BC and A B B, then A ∧ B BC. Cautious Monotonicity
(NRat) If A BC and not A ∧ ¬B BC, then A ∧ B BC. Negation Rationality
(DRat) If A ∨ B BC and not A BC, then B BC. Disjunctive Rationality
(RMon) If A BC and not A B ¬B, then A ∧ B BC. Rational Monotonicity
(Cut) If A ∧ B BC and A B B, then A BC. Cautious Cut
(CEq) If A B B, B B A and A BC, then B BC. Reciprocity
It is readily checked that
– And, Or, CMon, NRat and DRat are valid, while
– RMon, Cut and CEq are invalid.
(And) Suppose that (a) A > B, (b) ¬B > ¬A, (c) A > C and (d) ¬C > ¬A. We want to
show that (e) A > B ∧ C and (f) ¬(B ∧ C) > ¬A. But (e) follows from (a) and (c) and
And for >, and (f) follows from (b) and (d), by Or and LLE for >.
(Or) Suppose that (a) A > C, (b) ¬C > ¬A, (c) B > C and (d) ¬C > ¬B. We want to
show that (e) A ∨ B > C and (f) ¬C > ¬(A ∨ B). But (e) follows from (a) and (c) and
Or for >, and (f) follows from (b) and (d), by And and RW for >.
(CMon) Suppose that (a) A > C, (b) ¬C > ¬A, (c) A > B and (d) ¬B > ¬A. We want
to show that (e) A ∧ B > C and (f) ¬C > ¬(A ∧ B). But (e) follows from (a) and (c)
and CMon for >, and (f) follows from (b) and RW for >.
(NRat) Suppose that (a) A > C, (b) ¬C > ¬A, and either (c) not A∧¬B > C or (d) not
¬C > ¬(A ∧ ¬B). By RW for >, (b) excludes (d), so (c) is the case. We want to show
that (e) A ∧ B > C and (f) ¬C > ¬(A ∧ B). But (e) follows from (a) and (c) and NRat
for >, and (f) follows from (b) and RW for >.
(DRat) Suppose that (a) A ∨ B > C, (b) ¬C > ¬(A ∨ B), and either (c) not A > C or
(d) not ¬C > ¬A. By RW for >, (b) excludes (d), so (c) is the case. We want to show
that (e) B > C and (f) ¬C > ¬B. But (e) follows from (a) and (c) and DRat for >, and
(f) follows from (b) and RW for >.
(RMon) Consider the linear order pqr ≺ pqr ≺ pqr. Here we have p B q, not p B ¬r
(because not r > ¬p) and yet not p ∧ r B q (because not p ∧ r > q).
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(Cut) Consider the linear order pqr ≺ pqr ≺ pqr. Here we have p ∧ q B r, p B q and
yet not p B r (because not ¬r > ¬p).
(CEq) Consider the linear order pqr ≺ pqr ≺ pqr. Here we have p B q, q B p, p B r
and yet not q B r (because not ¬r > ¬q).
3. Disjunctive Rationality is stronger than Negation Rationality. DRat implies NRat
also in the context of contraposing conditionals: substitute A∧¬B and A∧B for A and
B, respectively, in DRat and use LLE and RW for > in order to derive NRat.
Moreover, it can also be shown that DRat for B is strictly stronger than NRat for B
provided that we allow non-injective models with only a partial ordering of the worlds
(Crupi and Iacona work with non-injective models with a weak ordering of the worlds).
Consider the language based on three propositional variables p, q and r and a model
with five worlds W = {pqr(1), pqr(2), pqr, pqr, pqr}. Here pqr(1) and pqr(2) are two
distinct worlds that satisfy p and q but not r. Assume that W is only partially (and not
weakly) ordered by ≺ and that we just have the transitive closure of pqr ≺ pqr ≺ pqr(1)
and pqr ≺ pqr ≺ pqr(2). This model violates Disjunctive Rationality, since we have
p ∨ q B r, but neither p B r nor q B r (since neither p > r nor q > r ; notice that
pqr(2) is a minimal p-world and pqr(1) is a minimal q-world). However, the model
satisfies Negation Rationality. Suppose that ABC but not A∧¬BBC. From the former
assumption, we have A > C and ¬C > ¬A. By RW for >, we get ¬C > ¬(A∧¬B) and
¬C > ¬(A ∧ B). From the latter assumption, we have either not A ∧ ¬B > C or not
¬C > ¬(A∧¬B). We conclude that not A∧¬B > C. We need to show that A∧ B > C.
If A is such that the set [[A]] of worlds satisfying it has a unique minimal element,
this follows directly from A > C and not A ∧ ¬B > C. So suppose that [[A]] has two
minimal elements (there are no sets with more minimal elements in this model). Then
[[A]] must be a subset of {pqr(1), pqr(2), pqr, pqr}. Since A > C but not A∧¬B > C, the
set [[A∧¬B]] must include one of pqr(1) and pqr(2) and in fact, since these two worlds
are linguistically indistinguishable, both of them. But then [[A ∧ B]] is a non-empty
subset of the minimal elements of [[A]] , and thus A ∧ B > C, as desired.4
4. The impact of modularity. Crupi and Iacona as well as Booth and Chandler work
with models that feature weak orders (aka total preorders) on possible worlds, that is,
asymmetric orders ≺ for which u ≺ v implies that either u ≺ w or w ≺ v. This condition
is called modularity.5 It implies that > satisfies Rational Monotonicity. However, we
have seen that while Negation Rationality and Disjunctive Rationality transfer from >
to B, this transfer fails for RMon. On the other hand, RMon for > has not been used
for the derivation of any of the above valid principles for B. So what is the impact of
modularity or RMon?
4This proof is an adaptation of the proof in Lehmann and Magidor (1992, p. 18) to the case of
contraposing conditionals.
5Other names for the same property are ‘negative transitivity’, ‘virtual connectedness’ or ‘almost-
connectedness’.
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Eric Raidl (2019) showed that it is the following condition:
(CV*) If ABA∧C and not ABA∧¬B and ¬A is a truth/belief, then A∧BBA∧B∧C.
Principle CV* is a restricted version of the condition called (8) in Rott (2019), the
restriction being that ¬A is a truth/belief. The unrestricted condition (8) is valid for
difference-making conditionals, but invalid for contraposing conditionals.
The possible-worlds interpretation of CV* is presented by Raidl; it presumes Lewis’s
requirement of Centering (there is only one world closest to w, namely w itself).
Let us now use the belief-change semantics using the Ramsey Test for > and verify that
CV* is valid, assuming that the belief set Bel is consistent. Suppose that (a) A > A∧C,
(b) ¬(A ∧ C) > ¬A, that either (c) not A > A ∧ ¬B or (d) not ¬(A ∧ ¬B) > ¬A
and that (e) ¬A is a belief. We want to show that (f) A ∧ B > A ∧ B ∧ C and (g)
¬(A ∧ B ∧ C) > ¬(A ∧ B). Using (e), the assumption that Bel is consistent and closed
and AGM’s Preservation postulate, we find that ¬A ∈ Bel ⊆ Bel ∗ ¬(A ∧ B), so case
(d) is impossible. Thus we may use (a) and (c) to infer (f), by Ref,6 And and Rational
Monotonicity for >. On the other hand, we have ¬A ∨ ¬C > ¬A ∨ ¬B, by (b) and RW
for >, and ¬B > ¬A ∨ ¬B, by Ref and RW for >, so we get (g), by DRat for >.
Two more remarks here. First, the Centering condition for systems of spheres, which is
common in truth-conditional possible worlds semantics, is not acceptable from a belief
revision point of view. Agents don’t have beliefs about everything, so there are several
possible worlds that are doxastic candidates for being the actual world (Grove 1988
vs. Lewis 1973). However, whenever A and C are beliefs in a consistent belief set Bel,
then A > C is accepted, due to the Ramsey Test and AGM’s Preservation postulate.7
Here we presuppose that Bel is consistent. A weakened version of Preservation will
actually do: if A ∈ Bel, then Bel ⊆ Bel ∗ A.
Second, can we express that A is a belief in the language using just conditionals? It
can be expressed with the help of the difference-making conditional ‘not ⊥  A’, but
it is not expressible, as far as I can see, with (the belief-revision interpretation of) the
contraposing conditional B, according to which ⊥ B A is trivially true, for instance.8
One way of making it expressible would be to introduce a designated (non-conditional)
sentence Bel expressing the strongest of the agent’s beliefs (Bel is true at all minimal
worlds, throughout the innermost sphere). Then we would have: A is believed if and
only if Bel B A is accepted in the belief state.
6Ref (for ‘Reflexivity’) is the axiom scheme A > A.
7Incidentally, one of my main reasons for introducing the Relevant Ramsey Test in Rott (1986)—
then called the ‘Strong Ramsey Test’—was that I wanted to block this and-to-if inference.
8Jake Chandler has informed me that he and Richard Booth have proved that the fact that A is a
belief is not expressible in terms of contraposing conditionals. In a brand-new draft paper, Eric Raidl
(2020) has shown how to remedy the situation by introducing an extra belief modality into the object
language.
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5. The same logic? Vincenzo Crupi and Andrea Iacona prove that their logic of
‘the evidential conditional’ in “Three Ways of Being Non-material” (2019a), which
is based on a probabilistic degree-of-assertability semantics, satisfies And, Or, CMon
and NRat, but it does not satisfy RMon, Cut and CEq (they don’t mention DRat or
CV*). In “The Evidential Conditional” (2019b), they have a truth-conditional system-
of-spheres semantics for ‘the evidential conditional’, which—they claim—“implies
exactly the same pattern of validities and invalidities” (p. 19) as the former semantics.
This claim is stated without proof. Crupi and Iacona don’t mention the principles
just listed in their later paper. However, the above checks have indeed lent inductive
support to their claim that the two semantics generate the same logic.
Much more general results on the non-probabilistic evidential conditional with com-
pleteness proofs are reported by Raidl (2019; 2020) and Raidl, Crupi and Iacona Raidl
et al. (2020).
6. Dual principles. It can be seen from the verifications above that And and Or are
essentially dual to each other in the context of contraposing conditionals, so Or might
even be labelled Andd.9 ‘Dual’ here means: take the contraposition of each sentence,
use logical equivalents where appropriate and relabel metavariables in order to avoid
unnecessary negations. Given the definition of B (and the substitutability of logical
equivalents), duals to each other have the same validity status. In exactly the same way,
Monotonicity and Right Weakening are duals for contraposing conditionals. There are
similar duals to the other validities and invalidities mentioned above:
(CMond) If A BC and B BC, then A B B ∨C.
(NRatd) If A BC and not A B ¬B ∨C, then A B B ∨C.
(DRatd) If A B B ∧C and not A B B, then A BC.
(CV*d) If A∨CBC and not ¬B∨CBC and C is a belief/truth, then A∨B∨CBB∨C.
(RMond) If A BC and not ¬B BC, then A B B ∨C.
(Cutd) If A B B ∨C and B BC, then A BC.
(CEqd) If A B B, B B A and C B A, then C B B.
Principle CMond is listed and shown to be valid for contraposing conditionals by Raidl
(2019, his name for it is ‘RCMon’). One of the simplest and most interesting of the
dual principles is DRatd, which may deserve a name in its own right. Let us call
it Conjunctive Rationality, CRat. It plays an important role as condition (1) for
difference-making conditionals in Rott (2019).
It is clear that the dual variants are just as valid or invalid as their respective originals.
– CMond, NRatd, DRatd and CV*d are valid, while
– RMond, Cutd and CEqd are invalid.
9This was already noted by Raidl (2019).
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If one wants direct verifications, they are again easy:
(CMond) Suppose that (a) A > C, (b) ¬C > ¬A, (c) B > C and (d) ¬C > ¬B. We want
to show that (e) A > B ∨ C and (f) ¬(B ∨ C) > ¬A. But (e) follows from (a) by RW
and CMon for >, and (f) follows from (b) and (d) by CMon and LLE for >.
(NRatd) Suppose that (a) A > C, (b) ¬C > ¬A, and either (c) not A > ¬B ∨ C or (d)
not ¬(¬B ∨ C) > ¬A. By RW for >, (a) excludes (c), so (d) is the case. We want to
show that (e) A > B ∨ C and (f) ¬(B ∨ C) > ¬A. But (e) follows from (a) and RW for
>, and (f) follows from (b) and (d), by LLE, NRat and RW for >.
(DRatd) Suppose that (a) A > B ∧ C, (b) ¬(B ∧ C) > ¬A, and either (c) not A > B
or (d) not ¬B > ¬A. By RW for >, (a) excludes (c), so (d) is the case. We want to
show that (e) A > C and (f) ¬C > ¬A. But (e) follows from (a) and RW for >, and (f)
follows from (b) and (d), by LLE, DRat and RW for >.
(CV*d) We again use the belief-change semantics using the Ramsey Test for >, assum-
ing that the belief set Bel is consistent. Suppose that (a) A∨C > C, (b) ¬C > ¬(A∨C),
that either (c) not ¬B ∨ C > C or (d) not ¬C > ¬(¬B ∨ C) and that (e) C is a belief.
We want to show that (f) A ∨ B ∨ C > B ∨ C and (g) ¬(B ∨ C) > ¬(A ∨ B ∨ C).
We have A ∨ C > B ∨ C, by (a) and RW for >, and B > B ∨ C, by Ref and RW for
>, so we get (f), by DRat for >. On the other hand, we can use (e), the assumption
that Bel is consistent and closed and AGM’s Preservation postulate, and we find that
C ∈ Bel ⊆ Bel ∗ (¬B ∨ C), so case (c) is impossible. Thus we may use (b) and (d)
to infer ¬C ∧ (¬B ∨ C) > ¬(A ∨ C), by Rational Monotonicity for >. But the latter
implies (g), by Ref, LLE, And and RW for >.
(RMond) Consider the linear order pqr ≺ pqr ≺ pqr. Here we have p B q, not ¬r B q
(because not ¬r > q) and yet not p B q ∨ r (because not ¬(q ∨ r) > ¬p).
(Cutd) Consider the linear order pqr ≺ pqr ≺ pqr. Here we have p B q ∨ r, q B r and
yet not p B r (because not p > r).
(CEqd) Consider the linear order pqr ≺ pqr ≺ pqr. Here we have p B q, q B p, r B p
and yet not r B q (because not r > q).
7. Comparison with difference-making conditionals. ‘Difference-making condition-
als’ as introduced in Rott (2019) were not meant to be compounds of other condi-
tionals, but intrinsically contrastive connectives (like the explanatory connectives ‘be-
cause’ or ‘since’). However, if one wants to go for a definition of difference-making
conditionals in terms of ordinary (‘suppositional’) conditionals, it looks like this
(DMC) A  C iff A > C and not ¬A > C.
First of all, we can convince ourselves of the fact that A  C and A B C are logically
independent.10 The arrows and crossed-out arrows in Fig. 1 indicate the kind of se-
mantic information that contraposing conditionals and difference-making conditionals








A B C A  C
Figure 1: Constraints imposed on relations between possible worlds by evidential
conditionals and difference making conditionals. Read the edge AC —I AC, for in-
stance, roughly as ‘for every world satisfying AC there is a more plausible world
satisfying AC.’ Arrows are pointing downwards to more plausible worlds. The neg-
ated edge AC —I∥ AC should be understood as saying ‘there is a world satisfying AC
such that there is no more plausible world satisfying AC.’ It may be thought of as
pointing either upwards or sideways.
encode. Utilising this information, we can show that even within the rather restricted
class of linear orderings of possible worlds there are situations in which the acceptab-
ility conditions of contraposing and difference-making conditionals differ: neither is
stronger than the other (cf. Fig. 2):
Case 1: Consider the linear order pq ≺ pq ≺ pq ≺ pq. Here we have p  q
(because p > q and not ¬p > q) but not p B q (because not ¬q > ¬p).
Case 2: Consider the linear order pq ≺ pq ≺ pq ≺ pq. Here we have p B q
(because p > q and ¬q > ¬p) but not p  q (because ¬p > q).
The intuitions behind the two kinds of conditionals are clearly distinct. Suppose that
A implies C. This is sufficient for making the contraposing conditional A B C true. In
one sense, A certainly “supports” C. For the difference-making conditional, however,
A needs to be a reason that makes a difference for C. If an agent believes C anyway,
even on the assumption of ¬A, she would not assert (nor accept?) A  C. More
specifically, contraposing conditionals of the form AB> (with > denoting a tautology)
are universally true, while the corresponding difference-making conditionals A  >
are universally rejected.
Though clearly different, there are a few features contraposing and difference-making
conditionals have in common.
7.1. Similarities. Both kinds of conditionals happily violate the And-to-If Inference
(also known as ‘Conjunctive Sufficiency’ or ‘Conjunction Conditionalisation’) and
defined by
(DPC) A  C iff A > C and ¬A > ¬C















but not p B q
p B q
but not p  q
Case 1 Case 2
Figure 2: Two cases showing that evidential conditionals and difference making con-
ditionals are logically independent, even within the restricted class of linear orders of
possible worlds. Here pq, pq etc. stand for single (partial) worlds.
Right Weakening. This is not to be regarded as bad behaviour. Rott (2019) even called
this violation ‘the hallmark of relevance’. The reasons for the violation of RW are
different. For contraposing conditionals it is just a corollary to the non-monotonicity
of ordinary (‘suppositional’) conditionals. For difference-making conditionals, it is the
(metalinguistic) negation in the second part of the defining clause.
Both contraposing and difference-making conditionals violate RMon, Cut and CEq,
but this does not seem to reveal a common ideology behind them.
Contraposing and difference-making conditionals agree in that they validate And and
Conjunctive Rationality, which are labelled (d26) and (1), respectively, in Rott (2019).
(But note that their ‘duals’, Or and Disjunctive Rationality, are not valid for difference-
making conditionals; for there is no such duality.) They also agree about the validity
of CV*, which follows from (8), as mentioned above.
Another property that contraposing conditionals and difference-making conditionals
have in common is that, surprisingly, ‘If A, then A and C’ is strictly weaker than ‘If A,
then C’ (and thus they violate what logico-linguists working on generalized quantifiers
have called ’Conservativity’, cf. Keenan and Stavi 1986, p. 275, and van Benthem
1986, pp. 8, 77). For both contraposing and difference-making conditionals, however,
‘If A, then A and C’ can be complemented by a conditional involving a disjunction to
get the full strength of ‘If A, then C’. For contraposing conditionals, we have:11
(E+) A BC iff (A B A ∧C and A ∨C BC).
11The right-to-left direction of condition E+ appears as axiom E in Raidl (2019).
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This is in a peculiar way similar to difference-making conditionals which satisfy the
following condition (see Rott 2019):
(2a) A  C iff (A  A ∧C and A  A ∨C).
Besides the violation of And-to-if and Right Weakening, perhaps most important among
the similarities is the fact that the content of ordinary, non-contraposing, de-relevantised,
suppositional conditionals can be expressed by the new conditionals in exactly the
same way. Let us devote an extra subsection for this point.
7.2. Recovering > from B and. This is the common way of recovering the ordinary
conditional > from both the relevantised conditional and the evidential conditional
B:
(SC) A > C iff A Ï A ∧C or A ∧C is a truth/belief.
Here ‘Ï’ is a placeholder for ‘B’ or ‘’. Compare Rott (2019, p. 18), Raidl (2019, p.
6) and Crupi and Iacona (2019b, p. 16, with credits to Raidl), with ‘belief’ applying
to the first and ‘truth’ applying the the other papers. The idea of SC can be used in
completeness proofs. Raidl calls it a ‘backtranslation’ from Ï to > and in fact uses
the object-language backtranslation formula (A B A ∧ C) ∨ (A ∧ C). The latter is not
expressible in the language of Rott (2019) that does not allow compounds of condi-
tionals. In the latter’s belief-change framework, SC is to be read as quantifying over
acceptance/belief in all belief states and the ‘or’ in it is a metalinguistic connective.
In order to get a good feel for the similarities and differences, I now sketch the proof
for SC, given either CPC or DMC, in terms of a Ramsey Test semantics based on
AGM-style belief revision.
The direction from the right-hand side to the left-hand side is easy. On the one hand,
A Ï A ∧ C is stronger than A > A ∧ C by definitions CPC and DMC, and A > A ∧ C
implies A > C, by RW for >. On the other hand, the fact that A ∧ C is in the belief
set Bel implies that the revision by A will not lose any belief, by AGM’s Preservation
postulate (presupposing that Bel is consistent). So C will remain in Bel∗A which gives
us A > C, by the Ramsey Test. (Notice that for the last argument it would be sufficient
to replace the assumption A ∧ C ∈ Bel by the weaker assumption that A < Bel and
A ⊃ C ∈ Bel.)
For the direction from the left-hand side to the right-hand side, we have to distinguish
between CPC and DMC:
– For CPC: Suppose that A > C and not A B A ∧ C. That is, (a) C ∈ Bel ∗ A
and (b) either A ∧ C < Bel ∗ A or ¬A < Bel ∗ ¬(A ∧ C). From (a), we get
by Inclusion (AGM*3) C ∈ Cn(Bel ∪ {A}), and thus A ⊃ C ∈ Bel. Therefore
¬A ∈ Cn(Bel∪{¬(A∧C)}). The first disjunct of (b) is excluded, by (a) and Success
and Closure. So ¬A < Bel∗¬(A∧C). We conclude that not Cn(Bel∪{¬(A∧C)}) ⊆
Bel ∗ ¬(A∧C), and, by Success and Closure again, that not Bel ⊆ Bel ∗ ¬(A∧C).
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Thus, by Preservation (AGM*4), A ∧C ∈ Bel.
– For DMC: Suppose that A > C and not A  A ∧ C. That is, (a) C ∈ Bel ∗ A and
(b) either A ∧ C < Bel ∗ A or A ∧ C ∈ Bel ∗ ¬A. From (a), we get by Inclusion
(AGM*3) C ∈ Cn(Bel ∪ {A}), and thus A ⊃ C ∈ Bel. The first disjunct of (b)
is excluded, by (a) and Success and Closure. So A ∧ C ∈ Bel ∗ ¬A. By Success
and Closure, we conclude that ⊥ ∈ Bel ∗ ¬A, which means that A is a doxastic
necessity. By Inclusion (AGM*3), it follows that ⊥ ∈ Cn(Bel ∪ {¬A}), i.e., by
Closure, A ∈ Bel. Since we also have A ⊃ C ∈ Bel, we conclude by Closure that
A ∧C ∈ Bel.
So we have verified that SC is in fact suitable for both contraposing and difference-
making conditionals.
Actually, a slightly different version of SC was used in Rott (2019, p. 17), namely
A > C iff A  A ∧C or (A is a doxastic necessity and C is a belief).
The reason for opting for this definition was that I wanted to maximise the range of
application of the main clause (A  A ∧C) and minimise that of the side clause. This
condition stresses that the acceptability of A > C and that of A  A ∧ C differs only
in the limiting case when A is doxastically necessary. I also mentioned (in a footnote)
an equivalent alternative definition with the side clause ‘¬A is not a belief, but A ⊃ C
is a belief’. Notice that the clause ‘A is a doxastic necessity and C is a belief’ is much
stronger, and that the clause ‘¬A is not a belief, but A ⊃ C is a belief’ is much weaker,
than the side clause in SC. An inspection of the proof above reveals that the weaker,
but not the stronger variant of the side clause is suitable for contraposing conditionals
as well.12
Incidentally, in ‘Definable conditionals’, Raidl (in press) does not use SC for , but
the alternative definition of A > C in terms of ‘not ¬A  ¬A∨C’ that is given in Rott
(2019, p. 18).
7.3. Dissimilarities. Contraposing conditionals also satisfy Or, CMon, NRat and DRat.
Difference-making conditionals do not satisfy these principles, but only counterparts
using de-relevantised conditionals:
(Orc) If A  A∧C and B B∧C and A∨B A∨B, then A∨B (A∨B)∧C.
(CMonc) If A  A ∧C and A  A ∧ B, then A ∧ B A ∧ B ∧C.
(DRatc) If A ∨ B (A ∨ B) ∧C and not A  A ∧C, then B B ∧C.
(RMonc) If A  A ∧C and not A  A ∧ ¬B, then A ∧ B A ∧ B ∧C.
Just a quick verification of DRatc which is not mentioned in the paper. Suppose that
A∨ B (A∨ B)∧C, i.e., (a) A∨ B > (A∨ B)∧C and (b) not ¬(A∨ B) > (A∨ B)∧C.
Using RW, we get from (a) that A ∨ B > C, and thus that either A > C or B > C, by
12However, the non-belief status of a sentence is not expressible in truth-conditional semantics.
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DRat for >. Thus either A > A ∧ C or B > B ∧ C. On the other hand, (b) implies
that not ¬A ∧ ¬B > ⊥, by LLE and RW for >. By RW and CMon for >, this implies
that neither ¬A > ⊥ nor ¬B > ⊥. This in turn implies that neither ¬A > A ∧ C nor
¬B > B ∧C, by Ref, And and RW. In sum, either A  A ∧C or B B ∧C.
8. Conclusion: formal properties vs. intuitive support. Given that contraposition has
long been supposed to be a paradigmatically invalid inference scheme for condition-
als, the logic of contraposing conditionals is surprisingly well-behaved. It is certainly
much more well-behaved than the logic of difference-making conditionals defined by
the Relevant Ramsey Test (that I had called the ‘Strong Ramsey Test’ in Rott 1986). It
validates not only And, CRat and CV*, but also Or, CMon, NRat and DRat. The latter
four principles are not valid for . So formally contraposing conditionals are nicer
indeed than difference-making conditionals.
However, I think that the intuitive motivation for the relevance/dependence idea en-
coded in difference-making conditionals is stronger than the intuitive motivation for
contraposition. I also think the relevance/dependence idea is a better fit for the notion
of support than contraposition. In Rott (1986), I took inspiration from Ga¨rdenfors’s
(1980) notion of explanation and Spohn’s (1983) notion of reason for my analysis of
conditionals in terms of the Relevant Ramsey Test. An important part of the intellec-
tual background to Ga¨rdenfors’s and Spohn’s papers were debates in the philosophy
of science as to whether a good explanation should require that the explanans makes
the explanandum highly probable (Hempel) or whether it should require that the ex-
planans raises the probability of the explanandum (Salmon, Jeffrey). Both Ga¨rdenfors
and Spohn endorsed, in different ways, the raising-the-doxastic-status approach, but
neither of them had conditionals in mind. To the best of my knowledge, the analysis
given in Rott (1986) was the first contrastive, positive-relevance interpretation of con-
ditionals, and it still strikes me as very natural—at least for one kind of conditionals
that has wide currency in natural language.13 On the other hand, once we have given
up the traditional conception that conditionals are monotonic (i.e., that they satisfy
Strengthening the Antecedent), I find it very hard to come up with a good intuitive
motivation for contraposition.14 And even if one is ready to accept contraposition, one
needs to have a clear argument showing that contraposition in fact encodes the ideas
of evidence and support.
Which conditionals capture the notion of evidence or support better? Let us try to
clarify the situation by an example. Suppose an infectious disease breaks out with mil-
lions of cases, and consider the following two scenarios concerning a certain treatment
13A very interesting use of probabilistic positive relevance for conditionals is made in Douven (2016,
chap. 5). Douven conjoins the positive relevance criterion with a high probability criterion (in reference
to a certain threshold value) and studies the logic of such conditionals.
14On the close relation between Monotonicity and Contraposition in a context in which Right Weak-
ening is presupposed, see Freund, Lehmann and Morris (1991) and Lehmann and Magidor (1992, pp.
180–181, 200–202).
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that has been developed to combat the disease.
Scenario 1: Almost all—more precisely, 99 percent—of the people infected were
administered the medicine, and 92 percent of those have recovered.
However, only few 10 percent of the persons who did not receive the
medicine have recovered.
Scenario 2: Only very few—more precisely, 0.9 percent—of the people infected
were administered the medicine. But fortunately, most people end up
recovering anyway. It turns out that within the group of people who got
the medicine, 89 percent have recovered, and within the group who did
not get it, even 93.5 percent have recovered.
Now compare the two scenarios. Suppose we know that Ann has contracted the dis-
ease, but we don’t know whether she received the medicine. In Scenario 1, we have
excellent reasons to say: ‘If Ann received the medicine, she has recovered.’ The fact
that Ann received the medicine would clearly support, or be evidence for, the fact that
she recovers. It would also make recovery very likely. In scenario 2, it is doubtful, to
say the least, whether we are ready to assert the same conditional. True, it is very likely
that Ann recovered, but having received the medicine would not support recovery, and
would not be evidence for it either. In fact, having got the medicine would even be
somewhat unfavourable to recovery. To the extent that we feel justified in saying ‘If
Ann received the medicine, she has recovered’, the assertion is more like an even-if
conditional (‘concessive conditional’) than an evidential conditional.
The two stories could have been told in qualitative, non-probabilistic terms right from
the start. But for convenience, let us adopt the simple rule that a possible world v is
more plausible than another possible world w if and only if the probability of v is much
higher than the probability of w—for concreteness say, more than eight times as high.
Let p stand for ‘Ann received the medicine’ and q for ‘Ann recovered’. Then a little
calculation shows us that the scenarios are captured by the following linear orders on
possible worlds:15
Scenario 1: pq ≺ pq ≺ pq ≺ pq.
Scenario 2: pq ≺ pq ≺ pq ≺ pq.
These are exactly the two cases illustrated in Fig. 2. In the first scenario, we have
p  q, but not p B q. In the second, we have p B q but not p  q. Comparing this
with our intuitive judgments, we find that gets the examples right while B gets them
wrong. Of course I cannot exclude that there are examples with the reverse result.16
15In scenario 1, the probabilities are approximately Pr(pq) = 91.1 percent, Pr(pq) = 7.9 percent,
Pr(pq) = 0.1 percent and Pr(pq) = 0.9 percent. In scenario 2, the probabilities are approximately
Pr(pq) = 0.8 percent, Pr(pq) = 0.1 percent, Pr(pq) = 92.7 percent and Pr(pq) = 6.4 percent.—Nothing
depends on the specific numbers of this example.
16When I was about to finish these notes, Vincenzo Crupi offered a potential example in private
communication.
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But at the time of writing, it seems to me that difference-making conditionals capture
the idea of support or evidence (or positive relevance or connexion) just better than
contraposing conditionals. The question to be answered by the advocates of contra-
posing conditionals, I think, is this: Why exactly should we use the ‘Chrysippus Test’
in the first place?17
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